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Abstract—Memory corruption vulnerabilities have been
around for decades and rank among the most prevalent vulner-
abilities in embedded systems. Yet this constrained environment
poses unique design and implementation challenges that signifi-
cantly complicate the adoption of common hardening techniques.
Combined with the irregular and involved nature of embedded
patch management, this results in prolonged vulnerability ex-
posure windows and vulnerabilities that are relatively easy to
exploit. Considering the sensitive and critical nature of many
embedded systems, this situation merits significant improvement.
In this work, we present the first quantitative study of exploit
mitigation adoption in 42 embedded operating systems, showing
the embedded world to significantly lag behind the general-
purpose world. To improve the security of deeply embedded
systems, we subsequently present µArmor, an approach to
address some of the key gaps identified in our quantitative
analysis. µArmor raises the bar for exploitation of embedded
memory corruption vulnerabilities, while being adoptable on the
short term without incurring prohibitive extra performance or
storage costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems are everywhere, from simple networking
equipment to satellite systems. With the rise of cyber-physical
systems and the Internet of Things (IoT), these systems are
set to proliferate throughout all aspects of everyday life. Due
to their ubiquitous and often sensitive and critical nature,
embedded systems pose many security and privacy concerns.
Unfortunately, proper attention to security in the embedded
world tends to be scarce in practice. This tendency becomes
clear from various studies [1], [2] revealing security flaws
in a wide variety of embedded systems. These flaws are far
from hypothetical. One example is the high-profile attack on
embedded systems known for having been used to construct
the IoT-powered botnet Mirai [3]. Yet embedded systems
security is seen as lagging behind what we have come to expect
of our general purpose (e.g., desktop and server) systems [4].
Embedded binary security, in particular, is an area where
exploitation of vulnerabilities is significantly easier than on
general-purpose systems. This is exemplified by a recent
incident where a previously unknown group calling themselves
the Shadow Brokers released a cache of exploits which they
claimed belonged to the supposedly state-sponsored Equation
Group [5] threat actor. Among this cache was a set of exploits
for high-end firewall equipment, none of which had to bypass
any exploit mitigations. Despite these threats, and the general
perception of embedded systems binary security as lagging,
we do not yet have a clear understanding of the existing
gap in security technologies available for embedded systems
compared to general-purpose computers.
In this paper, we study this problem and focus on three
major bare-minimum and well-known exploit mitigation tech-
niques. More specifically, we focus on Executable Space
Protection (ESP, also known as NX, DEP, or W ⊕X policy),
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and stack ca-
naries to identify the gap in security technologies specifically
in the memory corruption and exploitation domain. These
exploit mitigation methods are almost universally available
on general-purpose computers. We investigate whether such
mitigations are available in 42 major embedded Operating
Systems (OS). We found that half of them provide such
mitigations and the majority of them belong to the group of
so-called high-end embedded OSes. However, when it comes
to lower-end embedded OSes that are mostly being used in
so-called deeply embedded systems, exploit mitigations are
almost absent. The deeply embedded systems as described by
Koopman et al. [6] are a subset of embedded systems which
usually rely on 8-, 16- or (at the higher end of the spectrum)
32-bit micro-controllers. These systems tend to come in the
form of a micro-controller unit (MCU) or more extensive
System-on-Chip (SoC) devices, embedding both the core as
well as memory and peripheral devices into a single chip.
We investigated 78 common [7] embedded microprocessors
and microcontrollers to understand whether this universal lack
of exploit mitigations is caused by lack of hardware feature
support (i.e., Memory Management Unit (MMU), Memory
Protection Unit (MPU), or Hardware-supported ESP).
While the lack of exploit mitigations for bare-metal em-
bedded systems (i.e., devices without an OS) is addressed in
recent research [8], no research suggests a solution for deeply
embedded systems that are running multi-stack, multi-threaded
and real-time capable operating systems. This lack of solutions
comes with risks that are expected to increase. According to
VDC Research [9], the IoT has caused developers for deeply
embedded systems to move away from bare-metal embedded
systems towards deeply embedded systems running an OS.
Based on our quantitative analysis on the lack of exploit
mitigation support on deeply embedded OSes and considering
the recent research by Celements et al. [8] which addresses
bare-metal deeply-embedded systems, we introduce µArmor, a
set of LLVM passes that harden deeply embedded systems that
are running an OS. Our goal is to bring exploit mitigation base-
lines from general-purpose computers to the most constrained
end of the embedded spectrum. More specifically, µArmor
adds several exploit mitigation strategies to such systems. We
have built a prototype implementation of this concept and
evaluate the overhead imposed by µArmor in terms of code
size, data size, memory usage, and runtime overhead. Our
empirical results indicate that the induced overhead is very
low and suitable even for deeply embedded systems.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We perform a comprehensive, quantitative study of ex-
ploit mitigation adoption in 42 embedded operating sys-
tems. This analysis clearly shows that embedded systems
severely lag behind general purpose ones.
• We perform a systematic identification of the challenges
faced by embedded exploit mitigation adoption efforts.
Based on this analysis, we identify two major open prob-
lems and subsequently introduce a solution to address
them.
• We propose, implement and evaluate µArmor, an exploit
mitigation baseline design for deeply embedded systems
running a multi-stack, multi-threaded, real-time capable
operating system. Additionally, as part of µArmor, we
present µSSP, a stack canary scheme with a modular
violation policy handler allowing for the preservation of
the system’s availability.
II. MITIGATIONS BASELINE
The term embedded systems covers a large number of
different devices that are dedicated to a specific purpose. In
this work, we focus on so-called deeply embedded systems [6],
a subset of embedded systems which usually rely on 8-, 16-
or (at the higher end of the spectrum) 32-bit micro-controllers.
These systems tend to come in the form of a micro-controller
unit (MCU) or more extensive System-on-Chip (SoC) devices,
embedding both the core as well as memory and peripheral
devices into a single chip. Such a high level of integration
allows for low production cost and simplifies production, but at
the same time constrains capabilities with regards to memory
size, speed and power consumption. Deeply embedded systems
often lack user interfaces or have uncommon ones and tend to
run extremely minimal OSes (often with real-time capabilities)
or no OS at all (bare-metal).
We are interested in defining the absolute minimum set
of mitigations which should be reasonably expected to be
present in all modern embedded systems. Because of the
sheer diversity of embedded systems, we do not select our
baseline by strict criteria. Instead, we require them to be
adaptable across the embedded spectrum and not rely on
any specialized hardware feature not commonly present in
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) embedded hardware. The
minimum embedded exploit mitigation baseline we selected
comprised of ESP, ASLR, and stack canaries. These mitiga-
tions were selected because they are complementary and have
been integrated into virtually all modern general-purpose OSes
and development toolchains, including those widely used in
the embedded world. As such they are well understood and
can reasonably be considered to be the absolute minimum in
modern exploit mitigations.
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EXPLOIT MITIGATION
METHODS IN EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
In this section, we present a quantitative evaluation of
exploit mitigation adoption (as per our baseline outlined in
Section II) and dependency support among popular embedded
operating systems and hardware. The results of our quantita-
tive evaluation reflect the current embedded state-of-the-art,
allowing us to identify clear gap-areas and new opportunities
to improve the security of such systems.
A. Embedded OS Mitigation and Dependency Support
We evaluated 42 popular embedded operating systems to
present an overview of the current state of embedded OS
mitigation adoption. Our selection aims to be a represen-
tative sample of embedded operating systems and includes
those listed by the UBM Embedded Markets Study [7], and
various studies into embedded operating systems [10], [11],
[12] as well as some of the most popular mobile operating
systems [13].
We evaluated these 42 embedded OS for exploit mitigation
and dependency support through a combination of vendor sur-
veys, documentation consultation, and experimental validation.
An overview of the results (including the list of OSes) is
shown in Tables I and II, while aggregated results are shown
in Tables III and IV.
Note that we consider a mitigation or feature supported
iff it is supported by the OS for at least some (but not
necessarily all) platforms. Since this is a quantitative as-
sessment, it neither evaluates the quality of the implemen-
tation nor whether the feature is enabled by default and as
such the assessment is an optimistic one. We mark an OS
as providing a CSPRNG (Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-
Random Number Generator) iff provided PRNG (Pseudo-
Random Number Generator) functionality is advertised as
such or can be reasonably assumed to provide secure random
number generation functionality.
B. Embedded Hardware Feature Support
1) Von Neumann vs Harvard: Before we can discuss the
hardware features support for exploit mitigations in embedded
systems, we first need to consider that there are essentially
two main processor architectural styles: Harvard and Von
Neumann. The Harvard CPU architecture has separated in-
struction and data busses and thus allows operations to run
simultaneously, while physically separating signals and storage
for code and data memory. In contrast, the Von Neumann CPU
architecture has only one bus which is used for both data
transfers and instruction fetches, thus any value in memory
can be executed or interpreted as data, respectively.
TABLE I: Detailed Embedded OS exploit mitigation adoption.
Red for Mobile embedded OSes, white for regular embedded
OSes and gray for deeply embedded OSes.
OS ESP ASLR Canaries OS ESP ASLR Canaries
BlackBerry OS X X X Android∗ X X X
iOS∗ X X X Win 10 Mob.∗ X X X
Sailfish OS∗ X X X Tizen∗ X X X
Ubuntu Core∗ X X X Brillo∗ X X X
Yocto Linux∗ X X X Windows Embedded∗ X X X
OpenWRT∗ X X X Junos OS∗ X × X
µClinux∗ X × X CentOS∗ X X X
NetBSD∗ X X X IntervalZero RTX∗ X × X
ScreenOS × × × Enea OSE × × ×
QNX X X X VxWorks X × ×
INTEGRITY X × × RedactedOS 2 × × ×
Cisco IOS × × × eCos × × ×
Zephyr X × X ThreadX × × ×
Nucleus × × × NXP MQX × × ×
Kadak AMX × × × Keil RTX × × ×
RTEMS × × × freeRTOS × × ×
Micrium µC/OS1 X × × TI-RTOS × × ×
DSP/BIOS × × × TinyOS × × ×
LiteOS × × × RIOT × × ×
ARM mbed X × × Contiki × × ×
Nano-RK × × × Mantis × × ×
∗ Embedded OS based on Windows, Linux or BSD.
1 A µC/OS-II kernel version with ESP support is available via a
Micrium partner.
2 Due to the sensitive nature of RedactedOS, we have received it
on the condition of anonymity for the vendor. RedactedOS is a
real-time OS which is primarily being used for aerospace
applications.
TABLE II: Detailed Embedded OS exploit mitigation de-
pendency support for Memory Protection (MPROT), Virtual
Memory (VMEM) and Random Number Generator (RNG).
Red for Mobile embedded OSes, white for regular embedded
OSes and gray for deeply embedded OSes.
OS MPROT VMEM RNG OS MPROT VMEM RNG
Android∗ X X X iOS∗ X X X
Win10 Mob.∗ X X X BlackBerry OS X X X
Tizen∗ X X X Sailfish OS∗ X X X
Ubuntu Core∗ X X X Brillo∗ X X X
Yocto Linux∗ X X X
Windows
Embedded∗
X X X
OpenWRT∗ X X X Junos OS∗ X X X
µClinux∗ X X X CentOS∗ X X X
NetBSD∗ X X X
IntervalZero
RTX∗
X X X
ScreenOS X X X Enea OSE X X ×
QNX X X X VxWorks X X ×
INTEGRITY X X X RedactedOS X X X
Cisco IOS × × X eCos × × ×
Zephyr X × × ThreadX X × ×
Nucleus X × × NXP MQX X × ×
Kadak AMX × × × Keil RTX X × ×
RTEMS × × × FreeRTOS X × ×
Micrium µC/OS X × × TI-RTOS X × ×
DSP/BIOS X × × TinyOS X × ×
LiteOS X × × RIOT X × ×
ARM mbed X × × Contiki × × ×
Nano-RK × × × Mantis × × ×
∗ Embedded OS based on Windows, Linux or BSD.
TABLE III: Overview of Embedded OS Exploit Mitigation
Support.
OS vs. Mitigation ESP ASLR Stack Canaries
All evaluated OSes 20/42 13/42 17/42
Non-Mobile 16/36 8/36 12/36
Non-Linux/Windows/BSD 7/27 1/27 3/27
Deeply Embedded 3/20 0/20 1/20
2) Hardware Feature Support: The embedded world fea-
tures a wide range of different processor architectures and core
families with different capabilities. To establish an overview of
common embedded hardware capabilities, we make a selection
of several core families and map out their architectural style
and MPU, MMU, and hardware ESP support capabilities.
We evaluated 78 different core families for hardware de-
TABLE IV: Overview of Embedded OS Exploit Mitigation
Dependency Support.
OS vs. Mitigation Memory Protection Virtual Memory OS CSPRNG
All OSes 34/42 21/42 20/42
Non-Mobile 29/36 16/36 15/36
Non-Linux/Win/BSD 20/27 5/27 6/27
Deeply Embedded 13/20 0/20 1/20
pendency support. 57 of core family SoCs were based on Von
Neumann architecture and 21 of them were based on Harvard
architecture. An overview of the supported feature detailed
results reported in Tables V and VI. Our selection of core
families aims to be a representative sample of core families
belonging to major architectures and vendors in the embedded
space across industry verticals and includes, among others, the
most popular core families listed by recent UBM Embedded
Markets Studies [7] and EDN reader surveys [14].
TABLE V: Core Family dependency support in Harvard (H)
and Von Neumann (N) architectures. We consider a feature
supported if it is supported by all members of a given core
family and absent if it is not supported by any of them. Any
variation with regards to dependency support is denoted with
∼ and omitted from aggregated results.
Core Family Arch. MPU MMU ESP
ARM
ARM1 N × × ×
ARM2 N × × ×
ARM3 N × × ×
ARM6 N × × ×
ARM7 N × × ×
ARM7T N ∼ ∼ ×
ARM7EJ N × × ×
ARM8 N × X ×
ARM9T N ∼ ∼ ×
ARM9E N ∼ ∼ ×
ARM10E N × X ×
ARM11 N ∼ ∼ X
ARM Cortex-A N × X X
ARM Cortex-R N X × X
ARM Cortex-M N ∼ × X
PIC
PIC10 H × × ×
PIC12 H × × ×
PIC16 H × × ×
PIC18 H × × ×
PIC24 H × × ×
dsPIC H × × ×
MIPS32
PIC32MX N × × ×
PIC32MZ EC N × X ×
PIC32MZ EF N × X X
PIC32MM N × X X
PowerPC
PPC e200 N ∼ ∼ X
PPC e300 N × X X
PPC e500 N × X X
PPC e600 N × X X
PPC 403 N × × ×
PPC 401 N × × ×
PPC 405 N × X X
PPC 440 N × X X
PPC 740 N × X X
PPC 750 N × X X
PPC 603 N × X X
PPC 604 N × X X
PPC 7400 N × X X
The core families in our selection belong to the follow-
ing embedded architectures: ARM, MIPS32, PIC, PPC, x86,
TABLE VI: Core Family dependency support in Harvard (H)
and Von Neumann (N) architectures II
Core Family Arch. MPU MMU ESP
x86
Intel Atom Z34XX N × X X
Intel Quark X10XX N × X X
Intel Quark µC1 N × X X
SuperH
SH-1 N × × ×
SH-2 N × × ×
SH-3 N × X ×
SH-4 N × X ×
AVR
ATtiny H × × ×
ATmega H × × ×
ATxmega H × × ×
AVR32
AVR32A N X × ×
AVR32B N × X ×
8051
Intel MCS-51 H × × ×
Infineon XC88X-I H × × ×
Infineon XC88X-A H × × ×
m68k
NXP M683XX N × × ×
NXP ColdFire V1 N × × ×
NXP ColdFire V2 N × × ×
NXP ColdFire V3 N × × ×
NXP ColdFire V4 N × X ×
NXP ColdFire V5 N × X ×
TriCore
Infineon TC11xx H × ∼ ×
Infineon AUDO Future H × × ×
C166
Infineon XE166 N X × X
Infineon XC2200 N X × X
MSP430
MSP430x1xx N × × ×
MSP430x2xx N × × ×
MSP430x3xx N × × ×
MSP430x4xx N × × ×
MSP430x5xx N × × ×
MSP430x6xx N × × ×
MSP430FRxx N X × ×
Blackfin
Analog Blackfin2 N X × ×
ARC
Synopsys ARC EM H ∼ × ×
Synopsys ARC 600 H ∼ × ×
Synopsys ARC 700 H × ∼ ×
RL78
Renesas RL78/G1x H × × ×
Renesas RL78/L1x H × × ×
RX
Renesas RX200 H ∼ × ×
Renesas RX600 H ∼ × ×
1 Intel Quark Microcontrollers (D1000/C1000/D2000)
2 Although documentation mentions an MMU, it does not support
address translation (and thus does not allow for virtual memory)
which is why we consider it an MPU for our purposes.
SuperH, AVR, AVR32, Intel 8051, Motorola 68000, TriCore,
MSP430, C166, Blackfin, ARC, Renesas Electronics RL78
and RX.
C. Quantitative Analysis Results
Among the embedded OSes surveyed, we can distinguish
two major clusters in terms of capabilities and purposes:
• High-End: These OSes are aimed at the higher end of the
embedded spectrum and offer virtual memory capabilities
as well as often being POSIX-compliant. This includes
mobile OSes (e.g., Android and iOS), lightweight ver-
sions of OSes common in the general-purpose world
TABLE VII: Overview of hardware dependency support in
Von Neumann core families.
Von Neumann Mitigation Support Support
MPU 6/51 (11.8%)
MMU 24/51 (47.1%)
Hardware ESP 22/51 (43.1%)
(such as Linux, Windows or BSD) as well as OSes like
QNX or VxWorks.
• Low-End: These OSes are aimed at deeply embedded
systems, often have real-time capabilities and do not offer
virtual memory support. As such, there is usually no
separation between user- and kernelspace and instead of
isolated processes, there tends to be just a kernel running
a limited set of tasks. Examples are Real-Time Operating
Systems (RTOSes) such as ThreadX, RTEMS, Micrium
µC/OS and TinyOS.
From the results in Tables III and IV, we can observe that
all mobile OSes have support for every exploit mitigation in
our baseline and so do most Linux, BSD, and Windows-based
OSes. Outside of those, however, almost all other OSes (apart
from QNX) lack support for any mitigations whatsoever. We
can also see that while memory protection support is almost
universally present, virtual memory and OS CSPRNG support
is almost universally lacking in the low-end OSes aimed at
deeply embedded systems. From these observations we can
conclude that exploit mitigation adoption (and underlying
dependency support) is generally present only on the high-end
embedded OSes which derive from Linux, BSD or Windows.
When it comes to the hardware core families surveyed, we
can see that less than half of the (Von Neumann) core families
in our selection have MMU support. A small minority of core
families has MPU support (MPU was supported in 6 out of 51
in Von Neumann architecture), leaving just under half of the
Von Neumann core families in our selection without necessary
hardware support for memory protection and over half without
the hardware support required for virtual memory. This lack of
MPU and MMU support makes sense for the more constrained
end of the spectrum such as MCUs, which only have support
for integrated memory and no support for external memory.
Similarly, under half of Von Neumann core families in the
selection have hardware ESP support, meaning ESP can only
be implemented via software emulation on these systems.
As observed by Barr [15], UBM Embedded Markets
study [7] and other observers [16], the embedded world is
seeing a trend towards deployment of 32-bit CPUs (and for
the most high-end embedded systems even 64-bit CPUs [17])
over the traditionally used 8- or 16-bit CPUs. Since most pop-
ular 32-bit architectures are Von Neumann, this has security
implications, though these are possibly offset by the fact that
certain modern CPU architectures offer hardware ESP support
(e.g., ARMv6+, MIPS32r3+, x86, etc.).
Based on the above observations, we can conclude that
there is a gap when it comes to deeply embedded systems.
Only among the high-end Linux, BSD and Windows-based
OSes there are significant exploit mitigation adoption and
when it comes to low-end OS capabilities, the lack of virtual
memory and cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator (CSPRNG) support present obstacles to ASLR and
stack canary adoption.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
To explain the gaps in embedded exploit mitigation adoption
and implementation discussed in Section III, we now discuss
the challenges faced by embedded systems developers for
integrating mitigation within their software. Based on this
discussion, we will identify a series of open problems in the
field of embedded exploit mitigations and outline the design
criteria for exploit mitigations and OS CSPRNGs for deeply
embedded systems. Generally we can divide the reasoning
behind lack of exploit mitigation within embedded system to
the following groups:
1) Development Practices & Cost Sensitivity
2) Resource Constraints
3) Safety, Reliability & Real-Time Requirements
4) Hardware & OS Limitations
We discuss these open problems to understand why a mitiga-
tion is not available even though the required hardware features
exist or why hardware features are missing in practice.
A. Development Practices & Cost Sensitivity
Embedded systems development practices and design cul-
tures are different [18] from those in desktop or web appli-
cation development. Compared to the general-purpose world,
the embedded world is heavily fragmented [19] among many
different vendors and suppliers and technologies themselves
are fragmented into competing standards without clear market
leaders and individual solutions for specific problems. For
example, a typical embedded product is put together as the
result of a hardware vendor selling a chip, deployed with an
operating system and some drivers, to an embedded systems
manufacturer (the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM))
who integrates it into the embedded system in question (adding
some hardware peripherals, writing some software) and often
resells it to a brand-name company who adds a user- or
machine-to-machine interface and put it on the consumer
market. This fragmentation leads to the following issues:
• Lowest Common Denominator Vendors at the top of the
chain such as chip or embedded operating system vendors
often cater to very diverse customers and as such are
bound by the demands (in terms of capabilities, overhead
and cost increases) of their most constrained customers.
• Fragmented Security Requirements No single entity
oversees the entire software development life-cycle and
as such, there is no coherent, single set of security
requirements.
• Patching & Maintenance Issues In many cases no single
entity has the ability to patch or upgrade every piece of
software on a given embedded device once it’s shipped.
• Incentive Issues While there might be a strong case
for certain security measures when considering the end
product as a whole, there is usually little incentive on part
of individual vendors and manufacturers who are just a
single link in a much bigger chain. Embedded systems
markets are often characterized [20], [21] by a heavy
focus on time-to-market (earlier market introduction tends
to mean deeper market penetration and hence higher
potential revenue) and novel features: since embedded
systems are designed for a specific purpose rather than
general-purpose computing, vendors often differentiate
themselves on the basis of price and specific features
rather than generic capabilities unrelated to the specific
utility of the end product. As a result, there is little
incentive for integrating security measures if these are
not already present by default.
• Cost Sensitivity Embedded systems are often very cost
sensitive [4], they tend to be produced in large quantities
and as such even small cost increases per unit rapidly
amount to large overall production cost increases. In
addition, for the cheaper products a cost increase on
part of a single component soon amounts to a higher
percentage of total system cost, making it harder to justify
such a cost increase, especially with something that is
often so hard to quantify as improved security.
Finally, any cost savings might aid in gaining a market
advantage for price sensitive products. As such there
usually is a preference for cheaper, simpler hardware such
as chips with few features and limited room for over-
head. This matters from a security perspective because it
makes many hardware-based security measures infeasible
(because of the associated per-unit cost increases) and
means designers and implementers of embedded security
measures have to deal with limited hardware capabilities
and resource constraints.
B. Resource Constraints
Generally, embedded systems face significant resource con-
straints [21] since they are designed with a specialized,
dedicated purpose in mind rather than aiming to provide
general-purpose capabilities. As such, all resources considered
superfluous to this task are eliminated to reduce production
cost which results in limitations on code and data mem-
ory, processing power and hardware capabilities. Embedded
software, in turn, is designed to be efficient and have a
minimal footprint in order to meet these constraints given
the limited room for overhead. These constrains are including
code storage size, memory size, processing power, and power
consumption. An example of impact of mentioned constrains
on exploit mitigation is power consumption. This constraint
immediately conflicts with security measures that introduce
power consumption overhead (e.g., due to being computation-
ally intensive or requiring “power hungry” hardware).
In the context of this work we concern ourselves with four
major resource constraint areas:
1) Code Storage Size: This constraints limit code size
overhead and the introduction of additional functionality.
Many embedded systems are diskless and do not have
few KB or MB instead. Those systems that do have
permanent storage use something like a few KB of
EEPROM, usually to store configuration data only since
the infrequent changing of code means it is more eco-
nomical to arrange this via flashing a firmware update, or
are far more limited than hard disk capacities of desktop
or server systems (e.g., using SD cards of a few GB).
2) Memory Size: This constraints limit memory usage
overhead and often rule out the possibility of memory-
intensive computations. Embedded systems, particularly
deeply embedded systems, often do not have external
memory but rely only on a few KB or MB of on-chip
internal (S)RAM. Those systems that do have external
memory are often limited to anything from a few dozen
MB up to one or two GB.
3) Processing Power: While there is a trend towards usage
of more powerful 32-bit processors [15], [7], [16] run-
ning at clock speeds ranging from 100 MHz to around 1
GHz (the average in 2015 being 397 MHz according to
[7]) and there are plenty of embedded segments where
even more serious computing power is a must, many
embedded systems continue to use simpler 8- or 16-bit
processors with clock speeds ranging from 8 to 32 MHz.
Such a lack of processing power inhibits deployment of
computationally intensive security measures and certain
cryptographic algorithms.
4) Power Consumption: Many embedded systems have
serious power consumption constraints [21], [4] as a
result of being battery operated, having to last months,
years or indefinitely on a single battery while others
might get recharged more frequently. As such, this
constraint conflicts with security measures that introduce
significant power consumption overhead (as mentioned
above).
C. Safety, Reliability & Real-Time Requirements
Embedded systems tend to have specific requirements relat-
ing to safety, reliability, and real-time computation [6]:
a) Safety & Reliability: Some embedded systems have
stringent safety and reliability requirements which would
require certification of any security measures upon their
introduction and require them to be robustly reliable (e.g.,
maintain availability). This means, for example, that exploit
mitigations for these embedded systems will have to avoid
invocation of alert policies that violate safety and reliability
(such as abruptly terminating critical software upon detection
of attacks [22], [23]).
b) Timeliness: Many embedded systems are subject to
varying degrees of hardness real-time requirements and use
real-time operating systems (RTOS) to accommodate this. As
such, security measures for those systems will need to respect
those requirements [22]. However, such requirements might
inherently conflict with certain exploit mitigation designs
or their dependencies. Consider, for example, ASLR and its
dependency on virtual memory. Traditionally, the use of virtual
memory in real-time operating systems has been avoided due
to timing analysis complications [24]. Virtual memory poses
predictability problems regarding worst-case execution time
(WCET) analysis largely because of two issues [24], [25]:
1) Address Translation: Mapping virtual to physical ad-
dresses is commonly done using a translation look-aside
buffer (TLB): a memory cache that is part of the MMU
and stores recent address translations. However, address
translation timings are hard to predict, because a) not
all mappings are cached in the TLB leading to cache
misses requiring a subsequent page table lookup and b)
the TLB is shared between different processes.
2) Paging: Since physical memory is shared between dif-
ferent processes and any physical page may be selected
for replacement by the paging algorithm, predicting
whether a virtual memory reference results in a page
fault is hard. In addition, paging makes memory access
timings dependent on TLB and cache contents increas-
ing unpredictability. Finally, page faults may incur sig-
nificant overhead rendering a system non-responsive for
too long.
Various hardware/software-based proposals for real-time com-
patible virtual memory exist [24], [25], but to the best of
our knowledge, none of these have seen adoption by popular
RTOSs due to significant performance penalties or hardware
cost increases.
D. Hardware & OS Limitations
As a result of the embedded cost sensitivity and resource
constraints discussed above, embedded hardware and operating
systems are often lacking the features upon which modern
security measures depend. We will briefly discuss the impli-
cations of these limitations for the future embedded adoption
of the exploit mitigations in our baseline as well as identify
some related open problems.
1) MPUs, MMUs & Hardware ESP: As shown in Ta-
ble VII, under half of surveyed embedded core families have
hardware ESP support. While 32-bit processors are clearly
gaining increasing traction within the embedded world and
are even displacing 8- and 16-bit processors [15], smaller 8-
bit processors continue to dominate a significant portion of the
embedded space. While many modern 32-bit processors tend
to be Von Neumann and while many popular architectures
in this category have hardware ESP support (e.g., ARMv6+,
MIPS32r3+) there are others which do not. Even though
for many systems based on those smaller 8- and 16-bit
processors it’s quite reasonable to migrate to popular Harvard
architectures (e.g., AVR, 8051, PIC, etc.), many modern 32-bit
processors tend to be Von Neumann and while many popular
architectures in this category have hardware ESP support (e.g.,
ARMv6+, MIPS32r3+) there are others which do not have
such support. Considering that older Von Neumann processors
will continue to be produced and integrated into new systems,
this will leave a segment of embedded devices without hard-
ware ESP support which is an open problem. Additionally,
existing software ESP solutions (e.g., PaX’s NOEXEC) only
support a limited number of OS and architecture combinations.
As such, low-overhead software ESP support for a wide
range of common embedded operating systems and processor
architectures is currently an open problem. Additionally, while
Table IV shows that the majority of embedded operating
systems offer memory protection support, not all embedded
hardware offers the required underlying features to allow the
OS to make use of this support. Table VII shows only 47% of
all surveyed core families have MMU support and only 12%
have MPU support, which leaves 41% unable to accommodate
memory protection. Due to cost sensitivity as discussed in
Section IV-A, embedded systems manufacturers are unlikely
to migrate to costlier higher-end processors with MPU/MMU
support mainly for security reasons and as such this leaves us
with the open problem.
2) Virtual Memory: As discussed earlier, real-time require-
ments and lack of MMU support adversely affect embedded
virtual memory adoption. While Table IV shows that 50% and
44% of all analyzed systems and all non-mobile embedded
operating systems offer virtual memory support, this drops to
a mere 19% if we eliminate the Linux-, BSD- and Windows-
based ones. When it comes to deeply embedded systems,
virtual memory support is absent altogether. One also needs to
take into account that even if an embedded OS offers virtual
memory support, disk-less embedded systems cannot use this
to extend RAM since this would requiring swapping to disk.
All these constraints are so intrinsically tied to the embedded
space that it is highly unlikely that we will see universal
virtual memory adoption and as such the lack of alternatives to
ASLR suitable for embedded systems without virtual memory
remains an open problem.
3) Advanced Processor Features: Many modern security
measure proposals rely on advanced processor features to off-
set otherwise unacceptable overhead penalties. Such features
range from support for trusted computing (e.g., ARM Trust-
Zone), complication of kernel-mode exploitation, isolation of
code and data regions in memory and pointer bounds checking
to features utilized to support Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) as
well as cryptographic hardware acceleration.
When it comes to embedded systems, the problem with
security measures which rely on such advanced processor
features is that they are only available on the newest and
most high-end architectures. Even among the more high-end
embedded-oriented processors such as the Intel Atom or the
ARMv8-based CPUs the vast majority of these features is un-
supported. Additionally, such advanced processor features are
not likely to be adopted by any embedded-oriented processors
other than the most high-end ones anytime soon either, consid-
ering the corresponding cost increase. As such, any proposal
for embedded security measures seeking widespread adoption
will need to avoid relying on such advanced processor features.
4) OS CSPRNGs: Secure randomness plays a fundamental
role in the wider security ecosystem, not only for cryp-
tographic purposes but also as a dependency upon which
exploit mitigations rely. Since the design and implementation
of a CSPRNG is not a trivial affair, the provision of secure
randomness can be considered an important OS service. But
as can be seen in Table IV, OS CSPRNG support is far from
universal in embedded operating systems. This is particularly
visible in the non Linux-, BSD- and Windows-based operating
systems and even more so in those aimed at deeply embedded
systems. Porting existing OS CSPRNG designs from the
general-purpose world to the embedded world, even if it is
from a GP-oriented version to an embedded-oriented version
of the same operating system, is far from trivial for various
reasons which we describe in the following.
a) OS & Hardware Diversity: As discussed earlier in
this work, the embedded world is heavily fragmented. The
fact that embedded operating systems often seek to cater to
platforms with much more divergent capabilities than their
general-purpose counterparts means it is hard to identify
universally available, suitable entropy sources. So while there
exists a sizeable body of work around the design of embedded
random number generators, these designs are generally very
domain-specific as they rely on entropy sources (e.g., sensor
values [26], radio and GPS data [27]) present only in specific
embedded devices.
b) Resource Constraints: The resource constraints dis-
cussed in Section IV-B also impact embedded PRNG design.
Limited processing power, memory and code size constraints
translate to a need for lightweight cryptography [28]: small,
fast algorithms which still offer the appropriate degree of se-
curity. In addition, power consumption constraints necessitate
a PRNG design that avoids constant entropy collection, es-
pecially considering many battery-operated deeply embedded
devices spend most of their time in standby modes waiting for
event- or time-based activation to preserve battery life.
c) Low Entropy Environment: Perhaps the biggest hurdle
in embedded PRNG design is the fact that embedded systems
are generally a low entropy environment. Since they are de-
signed for specific, limited tasks. In the general purpose world,
where one can assume most systems have user peripherals and
disks one can use the associated system events (e.g., keystroke
timings, mouse movements) as a source of entropy. But for
most embedded systems, being headless and/or disk-less as
well as having no user interaction, this is not an option.
Ideally, this problem would be solved by having om-
nipresent, on-chip True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
available but considering embedded cost sensitivity issues this
is not realistic. So in practice, one sees a lot of workarounds of
dubious quality, which tend to lead to security issues of their
own. Common and insecure approaches are to use personal-
ization data (e.g., device MAC addresses or serial numbers)
as seed entropy [29] or rely on manufacturer-supplied initial
entropy, sometimes in the form of a so-called seed file. But
care needs to be taken here that these seed files are unique
per device, unpredictable and secret. This approach still leaves
various problems for embedded systems such as dealing with
disk-less nodes and not being applicable to the first system
boot (which is often when embedded devices generated their
long-term cryptographic keys).
V. SUMMARY OF OPEN PROBLEMS
Based on the mentioned constraints and our quantitative
results, we can identify two pressing open problems relating
to embedded exploit mitigation adoption namely: exploit
mitigation and OS CSPRNG design for deeply embedded
systems.
A. Deeply Embedded Exploit Mitigation Criteria
We can distill the following criteria for deeply embedded
exploit mitigations based on the observations in Section IV:
1) Limited Resource Pressure: Mitigations should limit
pressure on constrained resources to a minimum and
provide low worst-case (rather than average-case) over-
head upper bounds. As observed by Szekeres et al. [30],
exploit mitigations are only likely to see widespread
industry adoption if the average-case imposed code size,
memory and runtime performance overhead is between
at most 5 and 10%.
2) Hardware Agnostic: Mitigation designs should be hard-
ware agnostic to widen deployability across the embed-
ded hardware. This rules out any dedicated hardware
proposals and any reliance on specific hardware features
that are not commonly available in deeply embedded
systems. This does not include hardware features com-
monly but not universally available such as hardware
ESP.
3) Availability Preservation: Mitigations should offer
multiple measures to take upon detection of an attack
that allows for different degrees of availability preser-
vation, ranging from those that allow an attack to take
place without interfering to those that reduce availability
disruption to a minimum. The rationale behind the
former is that if availability is of prime importance,
the worst-case scenario for an exploited vulnerability is
to disrupt this availability and as such an unhindered
but reported attack that gains control of the system and
keeps it up is preferable over a prevented attack that
brings it down in the process.
4) Real-Time Friendly: Mitigations should not vio-
late real-time requirements and as such avoid non-
deterministic constructs. As discussed earlier, this rules
out designs relying on virtual memory.
5) Easy (RT)OS Integration: Mitigations should be easy
to integrate into existing (RT)OS without requiring
significant redesign of the operating system itself to
widen deployability across the embedded OS and reduce
integration cost.
B. OS CSPRNG Design for Deeply Embedded Systems
We can distill the following criteria for non-domain specific
deeply embedded OS CSPRNGs based on the observations we
made in Section IV:
1) Lightweight Cryptography: The CSPRNG will have to
be based on lightweight cryptographic primitives [28] to
accommodate code & data memory as well as processing
power constraints. Any OS CSPRNG design targeting
deeply embedded systems should be deployable on a
representative hardware platform and only utilize a small
fraction of available resources.
2) Entropy Gathering Limitations: The CSPRNG will
have to be designed in such a way as to not rely
on constant runtime entropy gathering to reduce power
consumption. This means entropy collection will have
to be rapid and preferably take place mostly during sys-
tem startup, given that many battery-operated embedded
systems are in standby or powered off between small
periods of event- or time-triggered activity.
3) Non-Domain Specific Entropy Sources: The CSPRNG
will have to draw upon entropy sources that are both
suitable in terms of entropic quality as well as nearly
universally present in deeply embedded systems. Ideally,
such entropy sources have high throughputs so sufficient
entropy is rapidly available at system startup and runtime
entropy gathering can be limited. While there is noth-
ing preventing CSPRNG augmentation with additional
platform- or device-specific entropy sources (e.g., sensor
values), these should not be the primary sources nor
should the choice of entropy sources be left up to the
system integrator.
VI. µARMOR DESIGN
In this section, we propose µArmor, an exploit mitigation
and OS CSPRNG baseline design for deeply embedded sys-
tems in the form of LLVM passes. µArmor seeks to address
the relevant gap areas based on the results from our quanti-
tative analysis. µArmor is targeted at those deeply embedded
systems which satisfy the following conditions:
• Feature either a (modified) Harvard architecture CPU or
Von Neumann one with an MPU with hardware ESP
support.
• Run a low-end deeply embedded OS (e.g. Zephyr, FreeR-
TOS, TinyOS) or kernel with a single address space and
without virtual memory support. The OS is allowed to be
multiple-stack, multi-threading, and real-time capable.
A. Attacker Model
We assume an attacker who is capable of exploiting memory
corruption vulnerabilities within the target deeply embedded
OS. Attacker wants to use such vulnerabilities to execute
arbitrary code or invoke arbitrary system functionality. We
assume that the attacker attempts to exploit a vulnerability over
a networking protocol (e.g., Ethernet or WiFi). We assume the
attacker does not have access to the specific firmware image
of the target device, but she may have access to the firmware
image of another instance of the system. Finally, µArmor does
not seek to protect against data-flow hijacking or data-only
attacks.
B. High-Level Design
µArmor incorporates three mitigations measures in order to
match the functionality of the baseline outlined in Section II:
µESP, µScramble, and µSSP in the form of LLVM passes.
In addition, it includes µRNG in order to provide required OS
CSPRNG support.
C. µESP Design
µESP is the Executable Space Protection (ESP) component
of µArmor and unlike other ESP implementations is explicitly
designed for MCUs running single address space OSes. µESP
assumes the OS can be modified for ESP-compliance, i.e.,
it allows for separation of code and data memory regions
as well as avoiding code constructs such as dynamically
generated code, stack-stored trampolines, etc. µESP explicitly
sets the hardware ESP non-executable bit for every memory
region belonging to a non-code region, while not setting it for
those owned by code region. Also, it ensures that no write
permissions are set for memory regions belonging to a code
region to avoid code modification attacks.
Furthermore, dynamic data memory objects (e.g., stack and
heap) are ensured to be fully placed in a data memory region,
and the stack is instructed to grow away from other data
regions. Since most stacks grow downward, by placing the
stack at the bottom of data memory, an overflow will cause
an exception either because it is a code region in RAM (thus
caught by µESP permissions) or because we try to write
outside of RAM. In a multi-stack environment, individual
stacks overflowing into each other could be captured by
placing a guard at the end of each stack if MPU granularity
and region count allows for this.
Finally, after setting up permissions, µESP will mark any
code regions responsible for MPU interaction or flash rewriting
(e.g., in the bootloader) as non-executable. The reason behind
such change is to avoid code-reuse attacks targeting these
regions for permission-changing payloads or ret2bootloader
attacks [31], [32], [33] and will disable further changes to the
MPU by making the relevant control registers non-writable.
D. µScramble Design
µScramble is a compile-time code diversification scheme
which imposes minimal runtime overhead. Compile-time di-
versification allows us to leverage the high-level information
available to the compiler, target multiple hardware platforms
implicitly, avoid the need for disassembly and binary analysis
as well as operate in an automatic fashion (as part of the reg-
ular compilation process) transparent to software developers.
Note that the choice between diversification at compile-time
requires infrastructures from the vendor. However, we believe
that making µScramble as a compile-time code diversifi-
cation is reasonable due to results discussed on Section IV
and major resource constraints exist within deeply embedded
systems.
Since the goal of µScramble is to thwart code-reuse
attacks, we aim to either eliminate gadgets, randomize them
or make it infeasible to guess their location in memory.
µScramble seeks to achieve this by diversifying code in
a fine-grained manner at compile-time. Additionally, since
µScramble needs to be semantics-preserving and to take into
account embedded resource constraints regarding code size,
memory usage and performance overhead we have created the
diversification transformations listed below for µScramble:
a) Register-Preservation Reordering: Most architectural
calling conventions specify which registers are callee-saved
and which are considered scratch registers. Compilers take
note of all registers used within a given subroutine and will
ensure that those which are callee-saved are stored to the stack
during the function prologue and restored from it during the
epilogue. Such sequences are one of the most common targets
for code-reuse gadgets due to their ability to act as register-
setters terminated by a return instruction. Since the exact order
in which these registers are saved to and restored from the
stack does not matter, we can randomize it and thus break
gadget chain assumptions about what values end up in what
registers.
b) Dead Code Insertion: µScramble supports two
types of dead codes namely, no-operation (NOP)-equivalent
instructions that do not present opportunities for unaligned
instruction gadgets and trap instructions which activate a
violation policy handler upon execution (something which
never happens during regular execution). The latter has the
benefit of raising alerts while any attempt to brute-force
gadgets is in progress.
c) Function Reordering: Unlike common function re-
ordering techniques [34], here due to embedded systems
limitation, we randomize only the function order and as such
the degree of diversification introduced is determined by the
number of functions present in the target code.
The above transformations affect both code topology and
code itself by randomizing the offsets of a) instructions with
respect to a function address, b) functions with respect to the
image base and c) one function with respect to another func-
tion as well as randomizing the order of register preservation
code. Due to the fine-grained nature of our diversification we
reduce memory object correlation and offer better protection
against information leaks and brute-force attacks than coarse-
grained schemes.
E. µSSP Design
µSSP is a component of µArmor which ensures proper sep-
aration of data and pointers within a given local stackframe.
µSSP works by placing the latter below the former so that
stack overflows cannot target code or data pointers residing
on the stack while the stack canary shields the stackframe
metadata (e.g., saved frame pointer, return address). µSSP also
complies with regular GCC Stack Smashing Protection (SSP)
function coverage parameters and is capable of protecting all
kernel- and application-code that runs after early kernel and
C support initialization.
On the operating system side, µSSP uses a single master
canary generated once at system boot for all OS tasks and
threads. Since on deeply embedded systems without virtual
memory there is no memory isolation for OS tasks nor a
separation between kernel- and userspace, periodic canary
renewal would lead to synchronization conflicts for a shared
canary. Our solution for this problem would be assigning a
dedicated master canary for each thread (or possibly only
OS tasks) as well as one for the kernel and renewing ca-
naries upon thread startup. The problem here, however, is
that without virtual memory different threads utilize shared
code which would require the compiler to figure out which
code is used exclusively by a given thread and which code
is shared, assigning a single common master canary for all
shared code to prevent synchronization problems. This limits
renewal effectiveness to such a degree, especially compared
to incurred overhead cost, that we simply opt for the single
master canary approach. In addition to that, the single address
space nature (and accompanying lack of privilege separation)
of most deeply embedded OSes would render a multi-canary
scheme rather irrelevant as well.
As far as canary generation is concerned, µSSP assumes the
presence of either an OS CSPRNG (e.g., µRNG described in
Section VI-F) or a TRNG (True Random Number Generator).
We provide OS CSPRNG support as part of µRNG.
The final components of µSSP is its modular canary vio-
lation handlers. Deeply embedded exploit mitigations should
offer multiple courses of action to be taken upon attack detec-
tion to allow for different degrees of availability preservation.
We provide (in case the OS do not support it) different type
of handlers which are discussed in Section VII-D.
F. µRNG Design
µRNG is our modification of a compact, software-only
CSPRNG design for ARM Cortex-M by Van Herrewege et
al. [35] with a 128 bit security strength level. It utilizes the
lightweight Keccak [36] sponge function as a CSPRNG [37].
For obvious reasons, we do not create our own CSPRNG
function. However, µRNG is not a simple reimplementation
of Keccak [35]. µRNG is extended to function as an OS
CSPRNG by adding reseed control suitable to constrained
embedded systems. More specifically, it avoids the constant
runtime polling for reseeding, typical in most OS CSPRNG
designs which puts a strain on power consumption. The main
purpose of µRNG in the context of this work is to serve as
a dependency for exploit mitigations (such as stack canary
mechanisms) but depending on chosen security strength, it is
perfectly suitable as a general-purpose CSPRNG. While, for
the sake of convenience, this work describes and implements
µRNG in the context of our representative platform, the µRNG
design is not restricted to any OS or platform in particular.
In µRNG entropy accumulation is done by Keccak sponge
absorption functionality while random number generation
is done by squeezing the Keccak sponge, allowing us to
use the same algorithm for both purposes. µRNG uses the
Keccak-f[200] permutation with rate and capacity param-
eters r = 64 and c = 136 respectively. Note that µRNG
is fully reseeded every 1GB of output which results in a
Keccak internal state of 25 bytes and generation of 64-bit
pseudo-random numbers per squeeze operation. We initially
seed µRNG with at least 256 bits of entropy and ensure
reseeding is done with at least 256 bits of entropy.
When designing reseed control we need to take into account
the applicability of passive and active state recovery at-
tacks [37]. In case of the former, the attacker cannot influence
seed data while in case of the latter the attacker can. As per the
original design by Van Herrewege et al. [35] upon which µRNG
is based, µRNG provides the required security against passive
state recovery attacks as long as reseeding occurs at least every
r ∗ 2
r
2 = 64 ∗ 2
32
= 32GB of PRNG output and against
active attacks as long as reseeding happens at least every
2
8
∗ r = 256 ∗ 64 = 2KB of output. Since our attacker model
explicitly assumes a remote attacker, incapable of influencing
our entropy sources remotely, we only take passive state
recovery attacks into account. We have to consider a trade-
off between overhead and security with respect to reseed
frequency: ideally reseeding is done regularly to keep as much
entropy in the PRNG as possible at all times but frequent
entropy gathering puts pressure on embedded resources in
terms of memory and power consumption. µRNG has two
options for reseed control:
• Consistent: Reseed control here is integrated into the
PRNG output function, ensuring at least 1 bit of entropy
is accumulated for every 64 bits of PRNG output, thus
ensuring a full 256-bit reseed every 2KB of output.
• Periodic: Reseed control is integrated into the PRNG
output function as well, together with a 32-bit reseed
counter which keeps track of the number of bytes output,
but actual reseed functionality is only invoked after the
counter exceeds a certain threshold value T. Reseed
functionality is designed to run for at most S seconds
(to facilitate worst-case timing estimates) and accumulate
entropy while resetting the reseed counter.
Additionally, µRNG uses non-domain specific entropy
sources that can be found on most embedded devices. We
can divide these sources into two groups:
a) Initialization: Initial entropy is gathered during early
boot and should be rapidly available in sufficient quantity
upon system startup to avoid the so-called boot-time entropy
hole [38]. We follow [35] in using SRAM Startup values
(SUVs) as our primary source of initial entropy. Using SRAM
SUVs as a source of initial entropy allows us to have an
entropy source that is present on most embedded devices,
instantly available in (very) early boot and differs from boot
session to boot session as well as from device to device.
As discussed in the literature [39], [40], [35], the amount
of entropy in modern microcontroller SRAM tends to be
around 5% of its total size at normal operating temperatures.
This means that, on average, µRNG would require at least
2∗128
0.05∗8
= 640 bytes of SRAM to guarantee a security strength
level of 128 bits, a reasonable restriction for most modern
microcontrollers.
b) Reseeding: Reseed entropy is gathered upon invoca-
tion of reseed control functionality and should provide either
at least 1 bit of entropy per invocation (in case of consistent
reseed control) or an appropriate throughput rate (in case of
periodic reseed control).
TABLE VIII: µESP Memory Permission Policies
Memory Permissions
Code (sensitive) RO+XN
Code (other) RO+X
Data RW+XN
Peripherals RW+XN
SCB Config RO+XN
MPU Config RO+XN
• Clock Jitter & Drift: The various oscillators (e.g.,
RC, Ring or VC oscillators) acting as microcontroller
clock signal sources are never completely stable and are
influenced by factors such as supply voltage, temperature,
etc.
• ADC Noise: Many embedded systems are outfitted with
analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) we can use it as
an entropy source by sampling the least significant bit
of ADC output corresponding to floating inputs. It is
worth mentioning that general suitability of ADC Noise
as cryptographic entropy source is unevaluated and as
such we recommend against integration unless proper
device-specific evaluation indicates suitability.
VII. µARMOR IMPLEMENTATION
In the following, we describe implementation aspects for all
µArmor components.
A. Representative Platform
µArmor is not intrinsically tied to any particular OS or
hardware configuration. However, for our implementation we
choose Zephyr [41] RTOS on a TI LM3S6965 microcon-
troller, which is based on a 50 MHz ARM Cortex-M3 out-
fitted with 256 kB flash, 64 kB SRAM and an MPU. We
chose Zephyr because it is an actively developed, open-source
OS with a permissive license aimed at resource-constrained
embedded devices and is supported by the Linux Foundation
and major chip vendors such as Intel, NXP, and Synopsys.
We picked the TI LM3S6965 microcontroller because it is
supported by Zephyr and is representative of a typical deeply
embedded system with limited resources. As noted above, the
µArmor protection scheme is implemented as LLVM passes.
B. µESP Implementation
We consider the following two common approaches to
deal with code and data memory in embedded systems: (i)
program code is located in and executed from flash and data
is copied to RAM and (ii) both program code and data are
copied from flash to RAM by a first stage bootloader and
further code (e.g., the OS kernel) is executed from RAM.
For µESP this corresponds to the permission policies outlined
in Table VIII. The sensitive code is a code which handles
rewriting flash memory, copying data from flash to RAM and
setting up memory permissions and is made non-executable
after execution. The MPU Config refers to MPU configuration
registers which are made read-only after memory permissions
have been set up and the SCB config refers to the System
Control Block (SCB) configuration registers.
TABLE IX: TI LM3S6965 MPU µESP Settings, execute-
from-flash
Region No. Description Perms. Size
0 Default RW + XN 4 GB
4 SCB RO + XN 64 B
5 MPU RO + XN 64 B
6 Code (other) RO + X 256 KB
7 Code (sensitive) RO + XN *
TABLE X: TI LM3S6965 MPU µESP Settings, execute-
from-RAM
Region No. Description Perms. Size
0 Default RW + XN 4 GB
2 SCB RO + XN 64 B
3 MPU RO + XN 64 B
4 Code (other, RAM) RO + X * MB
5 Code (sensitive, RAM) RO + XN *
6 Code (other, flash) RO + X 256 KB
7 Code (sensitive, flash) RO + XN *
With the Cortex-M3’s MPU available on TI LM3S6965
we can enforce µESP policies by making use of its support
for up to 8 memory regions. Memory regions can cover the
full 4 GB address space and come with size and permission
(in the form of XN and data access flags) attributes. Memory
regions start addresses must be size-aligned (ie. a 2 KB region
must start at an address that is a multiple of 2 KB). We do
not make use of the available privilege modes because we
do not want to assume OS compatibility with them and as
such our permissions apply to both privileged and unprivileged
modes. Based on the policies in Table VIII, we construct a
µESP configuration for the TI LM3S6965 in Tables IX and
X representing settings for execute-from-flash and RAM code
relocation scenarios respectively.
We start with a default region, using the lowest region
number, which covers the entire address space with RW+XN
permissions. If two memory regions overlap on the MPU,
region attributes fall back to the region with the highest
region number. We can use this feature to limit the number of
regions we have to specify and define overlapping regions for
exceptions to default data memory. SRAM and peripherals are
covered by this default region as well. We define a region for
code (covering all of flash memory) with RO+XN permissions
and use a higher region as an XN overlay for any sensitive
code (except the final line which locks the MPU) to be made
non-executable after system initialization.
For the scenario where code is executed from RAM, we
provide identical regions to be placed wherever in RAM the
bootloader relocates code to. Note that since aliased address
ranges need to be covered by the same permissions, this might
mean memory regions could need sizes bigger than the actual
amount of on-chip SRAM.
In addition to the above we have to consider the fol-
lowing security-sensitive memory regions: Interrupt Vector
Table (IVT) and System Control Block (SCB). The IVT holds
exception vectors such as the stack pointer reset value and start
address (loaded upon system reset) as well as interrupt handler
addresses. The IVT would be an interesting overwriting target
for attackers but by default it lives completely within the lower
region of flash memory and as such is covered by the RO+X
permissions of our code region. It is possible, however, to
relocate the vector table using the Vector Table Offset Register
(VTOR) in the System Control Block (SCB). If the vector
table is relocated to RAM along with other code as part of
a bootloader, this is not an issue because it will be covered
by the relevant code region. But to protect the system from
forcing a malicious relocation as part of an exploit (among
other things), we mark the SCB as read-only. If some SCB
functionality should be writable during runtime, µESP uses
the MPU’s sub-region feature which divides a region into 8
equally large sub-regions (provided the region size is at least
256 bytes) that can be disabled individually thus falling back
to default RW+XN permissions. If so desired, one could merge
the SCB and MPU memory regions into a single region using
disabled sub-regions to cover any addresses within the range
which should have different permissions.
C. µScramble Implementation
The µScramble diversification transformations were im-
plemented as LLVM passes which we describe in the follow-
ing.
a) Register-Preservation Reordering: This transforma-
tion is implemented as a MachineFunctionPass which
obtains the callee-saved registers of a function using
getCalleeSavedRegs, shuffles their order using the
LLVM PRNG and sets the new order.
b) Dead Code Insertion: This transformation is imple-
mented as a MachineFunctionPass which identifies the final
basic block of a given function and generates dead code-stubs.
We allow developers to specify what type of dead code-stub
(NOP or trap) they wish to generate with a compiler flag. NOP-
stubs consist of a single, repeated, architecture-dependent NOP
instruction to ensure minimal gadget usefulness.
Trap-stubs consist of branch instructions to a violation
policy handler, in our case we use the same handler used for
µSSP violations described below.
c) Function Reordering: This transformation is imple-
mented as a ModulePass which retrieves the current modules
function list and shuffles it using the LLVM PRNG. The linker
will ensure functions are organized in the randomized order
in the produced firmware image. All randomization operations
used in µScramble draw upon the LLVM PRNG which
draws upon a developer-supplied true random seed. Since this
PRNG is deterministic this means a given firmware build can
be reproduced from the seed as is done by Gionta et al. [42].
D. µSSP Implementation
We implemented µSSP as an augmentation of Zephyr’s SSP
implementation. Since Zephyr uses the GCC SSP model it
already meets µSSP’s compiler-side criteria. On the OS side,
it stores a single master canary value as a global variable
in .bss and initializes it at boot (as part of the _Cstart
function, after hardware initialization but before the main
thread is activated) by drawing from the sys_rand32_get
API.
We augmented this SSP implementation by adding sup-
port for a terminator-style canary bitmask, ensuring an OS
CSPRNG is available for secure canary generation and imple-
menting a modular canary violation handler.
• Passive: The violation handler simply returns to the
violating function.
• Fatal: The violation handler try to terminate the violating
thread and continue running the system.
• Thread Restart: To properly handle thread restarts we
maintain a global list (a hash table) of thread restart
handlers associated with thread IDs. We require the thread
ID be registered together with the restart handler upon
thread start and de-registered upon thread termination.
Upon invocation of the violation handler, the violating
thread’s ID is looked up in the restart handler list,
the associated restart handler is fetched, the thread in
question is terminated and the restart handler is invoked.
• System Restart: We invoke the sys_reboot API with
the SYS_REBOOT_COLD argument to perform a system
restart.
• System Shutdown: This approach depends on SoC power
management subsystem implementations. In the absence
of such functionality we default to terminating all running
threads.
E. µRNG Implementation
We implemented µRNG as a driver for the Zephyr
random API. µRNG output can be requested with the
sys_rand32_get API which squeezes the µRNG keccak
object to produce 64 bits (the rate minimum) of PRNG
output, the upper and lower halves of which are xor-summed
together to produce a 32-bit random number as per API
specifications. Since our µRNG implementation uses SRAM
SUVs as its initial entropy source, it is important that this
entropy collection takes place as early as possible to reduce
SRAM contamination (from code storing variables, using
the stack, etc.) as much as possible. We chose to integrate
µRNG initialization in Zephyr’s __start routine which is the
firmware code entrypoint and used as the reset handler
in the ARM Cortex-M’s vector table. Note that almost
all RTOSes provide such initialization routine. This ensures
SRAM is untouched before our µRNG initialization code is
invoked.
VIII. µARMOR EVALUATION & LIMITATIONS
A. Overhead Evaluation
We evaluate the overhead imposed by µArmor in terms of
code size, data size, memory usage, and runtime increases.
Code and data size figures represent increases in code (in
flash) and constants (in SRAM) respectively. Memory usage
increases represents a worst-case SRAM overhead imposition
(by use of dynamic data structures) at any point during exe-
cution. We instrumented application code to measure runtime
performance using a hardware high precision counter. Runtime
performance figures represent increases in the number of
clockcycles consumed for a given amount of code to run,
reported as the average of 25 runs.
We evaluate µESP, µSSP, µRNG separately in Tables XII,
XIII and XIV and µScramble in Tables XI. Note that
evaluation results for memory overhead is based on worst-
case estimate and the results for runtime overhead are from
average of 25 runs. To get an idea of the overhead on realistic
applications we chose three sample Zephyr IoT applications
stressing different subsystems: Additionally, due to space
restrictions, we eliminated in Table XI the results for the data
size, memory, and runtime overhead with respect to application
and runtime since there was no difference before and after
using µScramble.
• philosopher: An implementation of the dining
philosophers problem using multiple preemptible and
cooperative threads of differing priorities [43].
• net/echo_server: An IPv4/IPv6 UDP/TCP echo
server application [44].
• net/telnet: IPv4/IPv6 telnet service providing a shell
with two shell modules: net and kernel [45].
TABLE XI: µScramble Overhead with respect to Applica-
tions (A) and Resources (R) in average of 25 variants.
App % CS1
(A)
% CS
1 (R)
App % CS
(A)1
% CS1
(R)
Application Test
lift 1.5 0 cover 1.2 0
powerwindow 2.2 0.1 duff 3
test3 0.4 0.1
Kernel Sequential
binarysearch 3.8 0 adpcm_dec 1.1 0
bitcount 2.3 0 adpcm_enc 1.3 0
bitonic 4.2 0 ammunition 1.1 0.1
bsort 3.5 0 anagram 1.8 0
complex_updates 1.6 0 audiobeam 1.6 0
countnegative 3.4 0 cjpeg_transupp 1.2 0
fac 4 0 dijkstra 1.9 0
fft 2.6 0 epic 1.6 0
filterbank 1 0 fmref 1 0
fir2dim 1.5 0 gsm_dec 1.3 0
iir 2.2 0 h264_dec 0.8 0
insertsort 1.9 0 huff_dec 1.8 0
jfdctint 1.3 0 huff_enc 1.6 0
lms 1.4 0 mpeg2 1.1 0.1
ludcmp 0.9 0 ndes 1 0
matrix1 3 0 petrinet 0.2 0
md5 1.9 0 rijndael_dec 0.3 0
minver 0.8 0 rijndael_enc 0.3 0
pm 0.8 0 statemate 0.5 0
prime 1.8 0
quicksort 0.9 0
recursion 4.6 0
sha 1.8 0
st 2 0
basicmath 0.7 0
1 Percentage of Code Size (CS) Overhead
We evaluate µESP, µSSP, and µRNG against the above
representative applications compiled for the TI LM3S6965
with GCC as provided by the Zephyr SDK. We evaluate
µScramble against a different set of applications since the
overhead imposed by µScramble on a single application is
non-deterministic and is dependent to parameters such as the
number of functions. Thus we evaluate µScramble against a
set of 50 benchmarks and applications from the TACLeBench
suite [46]. TACLeBench consists of self-contained programs
without external or OS dependencies and is drawn from
well-known (embedded) benchmarking suites such as DSP-
Stone [47], MRTC WCET [48], SNU-RT [49], MiBench [50],
MediaBench [51], NetBench and HPEC [52]. The benchmarks
in question are drawn from various embedded domains ranging
from automotive and networking to security and telecommuni-
cations and are sub-divided into application, kernel, sequential
and test groups implementing realistic applications, small
kernel functions, large sequential functions and artificial stress
tests respectively.
TABLE XII: µESP Overhead Evaluation with respect to (wrt)
application and resources
Wrt. Application %Code %Data %Memory %Runtime
philosopher 1.2 0 × (0 B) 0
echo_server 0.2 0 × (0 B) 0
telnet 0.2 0 × (0 B) 0
Wrt. Resources
philosopher 0 0 0 ×
echo_server 0 0 0 ×
telnet 0 0 0 ×
TABLE XIII: µSSP Overhead Evaluation
Wrt. Application %Code % Data %Memory %Runtime
philosopher 30.5 0 × (48 B) 0
echo_server 26.4 0 × (84 B) 0.7
telnet 27.3 0 × (84 B) 0.7
Wrt. Resources
philosopher 0.9 0 0 ×
echo_server 5 0 0 ×
telnet 5 0 0 ×
TABLE XIV: µRNG Overhead Evaluation
Wrt. Application % Code % Data %Memory %Runtime
philosopher 10.2 0.4 × (52 B) 0
echo_server 1.4 0.1 × (52 B) 0
telnet 1.5 0.1 × (52 B) 0
Wrt. Resources
philosopher 0.3 0 0 ×
echo_server 0.3 0 0 ×
telnet 0.3 0 0 ×
We are not interested in average memory usage overheads
but rather in worst case figures because of potentially un-
acceptable SRAM pressure. Using stack depth analysis em-
bedded developers get an indication of the maximum amount
of memory used by the stack in their application. We have
decided to obtain a stack depth estimate in between the usual
lower bounds derived from experimental observation and the
upper bounds derived from static analysis. This estimate is de-
rived from multiplying the longest identified call chain in the
program Control Flow Graph (CFG) by the overhead imposed
by a single canary. Note that we report overhead figures both
with respect to the original unprotected application and with
respect to total device resources.
Based on the reported figures above, we can conclude code
size overheads stay below 5% with respect to the application
for all components except µSSP and µRNG and are less than
or equal to 5% with respect to total device resources for all
components. Data size, memory usage and runtime overheads
all stay well below 1% both with respect to the application
as well as with respect to total device resources. µSSP code
size overheads are clearly the heaviest overhead imposition
of all metrics and components. µSSP introduces roughly
4 instructions of prologue and 5 instructions of epilogue
overhead amounting to 36 bytes per protected function. While
the average code overhead with respect to the unprotected
application is 28.1%, we can see overhead in terms of total
resource pressure remains equal to or below 5%.
B. Security Evaluation and Limitations
1) µESP Security: µESP protects against both code injec-
tion and code modification by enforcing a separation between
code and data memory, forcing an attacker to use a code-
reuse payload. By locking the MPU and rendering µESP
and bootloader code non-executable after it has been run,
µESP protects against code-reuse attacks that seek to cir-
cumvent µESP by means of permission-changing payloads
or ret2bootloader attacks [32], [33] that seek to rewrite flash
memory with attacker-injected code.
2) µScramble Security: To get an idea of the en-
tropic quality of µScramble transformations we performed
a coverage analysis consisting of taking our selection
from the TACLeBench suite and generating 1000 different
µScramble-diversified variants for each benchmark. We then
harvest all gadgets from each variant using a ROPGadget [53]
and determined, for each gadget in each variant, in how many
other variants the gadget still resides at the same address. We
then obtained the average and maximum gadget survival rates.
These gadget survival rates give us an indication as to the
quality of µScramble’s coverage of the target gadget space.
The detailed results of this analysis are reported in Table XV.
TABLE XV: µScramble Coverage Analysis.
Set Avg.
GS1
Max.
GS1
Set Avg.
GS1
Max.
GS1
Application Application
lift 2 9 cover 29.8 143
powerwindow 1.2 10 duff 1.6 7
test3 0 0
Kernel Sequential
binarysearch 1.4 13 adpcm_dec 0.5 4
bitcount 63.3 180 adpcm_enc 0.6 5
bitonic 85.15 166 ammunition 3.6 147
bsort 58.5 171 anagram 0.6 4
complex_updates68.1 199 audiobeam 4 79
countnegative 2 11 cjpeg_transupp32 96
fac 2.5 4 cjpeg_wrbmp 1.4 3
fft 1.2 5 dijkstra 1.3 5
filterbank 59.9 209 epic 0 0
fir2dim 70.5 210 fmref 0.5 3
iir 2.5 8 gsm_dec 1.3 43
insertsort 101.5 202 h264_dec 100 181
jfdctint 97 193 huff_dec 18.8 91
lms 64.2 193 huff_enc 5.8 55
ludcmp 55.4 166 mpeg2 0 0
matrix1 68.8 203 ndes 0.6 2
md5 0.6 7 petrinet 2 2
minver 1.3 5 rijndael_dec 2.5 16
pm 12.5 97 rijndael_enc 3 11
prime 0.9 5 statemate 16.4 97
quicksort 1.5 9
recursion 91.6 188
sha 2.3 6
st 0.8 3
basicmath 1 4
1 Gadget Survival
The results of our analysis demonstrate that the highest av-
erage gadget survival rate is 101.5 (for insertsort) and the
highest maximum gadget survival rate is 210 (for fir2dim)
while most remain well below those numbers. This means
that in a worst case scenario, a single gadget survives across
roughly 10.15% of variants on average and across 21% of
them at most, requiring brute-force for all other variants. Thus
an attacker constructing a code-reuse payload from a given
firmware variant cannot expect any gadget in this payload to
work beyond 10.15% of target devices. Attacker also needs to
consider that the gadget survival variants of different gadgets
do not necessarily intersect. As such, prospects for gadget
chain survival are even worse and brute-force search space
scales with respect to payload length as well.
3) µSSP Security: The security offered by µSSP is inher-
ently constrained by the limits of stack canaries: they only
protect against stack buffer overflows targeting stackframe
metadata and not against other types memory corruption
vulnerabilities nor against stack buffer overflows targeting
local code or data pointers. That being said, µSSP draws upon
an OS CSPRNG (in the form of µRNG) to generate canaries
with 32 or 24 bits of entropy (depending on whether they
are configured to be terminator style or not) which are, as
such, not susceptible to either the insecure randomness issues
or the system-side information leaks affecting the original
Zephyr SSP canaries in the absence of a TRNG. Since the
master canary value is refreshed upon system boot, the system
restart, Fatal and system shutdown violation policies are not
susceptible to bruteforce approaches at all. The thread restart
policy is susceptible to bruteforce attacks. All approaches,
however, raise at least an alert upon invocation. We believe
that given our attacker model, 32 bits of entropy is sufficient
for a bruteforce attack to be infeasible.
C. Limitations
In the following, we discuss limitations of our approach and
the prototype implementation. First, µArmor requires either a
(modified) Harvard or Von Neumann CPU featuring an MPU
with hardware ESP support. We believe that this limitation
is within reasonable bounds for our system to be considered
hardware agnostic, since it only excludes older Von Neumann
architectures for which there is currently no way to enforce
low-overhead ESP.
Second, the µScramble component only diversifies code
memory and only provides per-device diversity: it does not
diversify data memory nor does it diversify on a per-boot
or per-application run basis. Finally, the µRNG component
requires on-chip SRAM or otherwise requires an alternative
source of initial entropy.
IX. RELATED WORK
A relevant stream of work has explored software diversifica-
tion. For example, AVRAND [54] is a boot-time software only
diversification scheme that randomizes binary code at a per-
page granularity level. The AVRAND imposes an average code
size increase of 20% and requires sizable meta-data storage
in EEPROM. Note that AVRAND requires re-flashing flash
memory upon randomization which reduces embedded device
lifespan. MAVR is a boot-time diversification scheme [55]
for UAV control system. However, MAVR is not hardware
agnostic since it requires (costly) hardware modifications.
Note that both MAVR and AVRAND require re-flashing flash
memory upon randomization which reduces embedded device
lifespan. Abbasi et al. [56] introduced µShield , a CFI system
for embedded COTS binaries with configurable protection
policies to cope with limited resources in embedded systems.
However, µShield addresses high-end embedded devices. An-
other stream of work explored firmware integrity verifica-
tion for embedded systems. For example Doppelganger [57]
protects embedded systems from firmware modification via
software symbiotes, a specific integrity verification trap which
is invoked every time it gets executed. However, Doppelganger
can only verify the static part of the firmware.
Finally, Clements et al. recently proposed EPOXY [8],
to protect bare-metal deeply embedded systems. There are
several key limitations to the EPOXY [8] work that set it
apart from µArmor. First, µArmor targets a class of deeply
embedded systems not addressed by EPOXY: those running an
OS. EPOXY was designed to protect single-stack bare-metal
embedded systems and is not suitable for deployment on multi-
stack RTOS systems without significant re-engineering (e.g.,
such as with regards to scalability of safe-stack overhead, inte-
grating privilege overlays transparently with OS mechanisms).
Second, EPOXY privilege overlay security model could
be broken by an attacker returning to any legitimate call-site
where the privilege elevation handler is invoked. Consider,
for example, the Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 EPOXY Privilege Overlay Issue
1: Begin REQUEST PRIVILEGED EXECUTION
2: Save Register and Flags State
3: if In Unprivileged Mode then
4: Execute SVC 0xFE (Elevate Privileges)
5: end if
6: Restore Register and Flags
7: Execute Restricted Operation
8: Set Bit 0 of Control Register (Reduces Privileges)
9: END
Here an attacker could return to line 2 where supervisor call
(SVC 0xFE) would invoke the custom EPOXY SVC Handler
(see related EPOXY code at [58]). The handler would check
whether the interrupt source was correct regardless of un-
privileged control-flow leading up to it and as such would
elevate privileges allowing the attacker to execute the restricted
operation in line 7. Code diversification would not help much
because many restricted operations are located at static or
easily obtainable addresses (e.g., extracted from the IVT).
Third, EPOXY code diversification approach is less fine-
grained than that of µArmor since it only randomizes function
order but does not diversify function sizes (and thus leaves
gadget offsets with respect to function addresses intact) nor
does it reorder register preservation code. As such, EPOXY
code diversification is more vulnerable to information leaks
than µArmor.
Finally, unlike µArmor, EPOXY does not protect against
ret2bootloader style attacks [31], [33], [32] because it leaves
sensitive bootloader code that cannot be relocated executable
after system initialization As a result, an attacker can return to
potentially sensitive code areas allowing for re-flashing code
memory or disabling the MPU.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented the first quantitative study
of exploit mitigation adoption in a representative selection of
embedded operating systems, showing the embedded world
(deeply embedded system in particular) to significantly lag be-
hind the general-purpose world. The resulting ease of exploita-
tion of memory corruption vulnerabilities and notoriously
prolonged vulnerability exposure windows in the embedded
world are cause for concern. We have presented how hardware
and OS limitations and performance constraints contribute to
an imposing series of constraints for developers of embedded
exploit mitigations to overcome. To address this situation we
have presented µArmor, an exploit mitigation baseline design
for deeply embedded systems. We have shown that µArmor
holds up favorably in terms of overhead imposition and offered
security.
We see two main trajectories for future work on embed-
ded binary security: long-term and short-term solutions. The
former trajectory aims to develop robust techniques tackling
the problem at the root and requires changes along the whole
development chain. Examples are embedded-oriented safe
languages and secure and scalable patching solutions.
The short-term trajectory should aim to develop solutions
which reduce the impact of embedded memory corruption
vulnerabilities and which can be rapidly adopted.
Finally, we should also seek for more advanced mitigations
for embedded systems in order to continue raising the bar and
close the mitigation security gap between general-purpose and
embedded systems.
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